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Abstract
This paper is a note on new directions and methodologies for validation and ex-
planation of Machine Learning (ML) models employed for retail credit scoring
in finance. Our proposed framework draws motivation from the field of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) security and adversarial ML where the need for certifying the
performance of the ML algorithms in the face of their overwhelming complexity
poses a need for rethinking the traditional notions of model architecture selection,
sensitivity analysis and stress testing. Our point of view is that the phenomenon of
adversarial perturbations, when detached from the AI security domain, has purely
algorithmic roots and fall within the scope of model risk assessment. We propose
a model criticism and explanation framework based on adversarially generated
counterfactual examples for tabular data. A counterfactual example to a given
instance in this context, is defined as a synthetically generated data point sampled
from the estimated data distribution which is treated differently by a model.
The counterfactual examples can be used to provide black-box instance level ex-
planation of the model behaviour as well as studying the regions in the input space
where the model performance deteriorates. Adversarial example generating algo-
rithms are extensively studied in image and natural language processing (NLP)
domains. However, most financial data come in tabular format and naive appli-
cation of the existing techniques on this class of datasets generates unrealistic
samples. In this paper we propose a counterfactual example generation method
capable of handling tabular data including discrete and categorical variables. Our
proposed algorithm uses a gradient free optimization based on genetic algorithms
and therefore is applicable to any classification model.
1 Introduction
The recent revolutionary advances in deep learning applied to computer vision, speech recognition,
natural language processing and reinforcement learning has ignited motivation in quantitative fi-
nance research for applying similar techniques in areas such as asset pricing, trading credit risk,
algorithmic trading, fraud modelling and retail credit risk scoring [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Witnessing the suc-
cess of these algorithms in capturing the relevant latent feature representations of the data relevant to
the task at hand, without the need for feature engineering by human, it is natural to expect the same
to be accomplished for the typical tabular datasets arising in the financial modelling domain, i.e., to
replace the traditional subject matter expert-led model development process by a purely data-driven
machine learning process.
∗All contents and opinions expressed in this document are solely those of the authors and do not represent
the view of RBC Financial Group.
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The financial industry has already witnessed significant integration of AI within the advanced an-
alytics functions such as customer engagement via NLP-powered chat bots, marketing, fraud risk
management and many other areas. However, at the same time the arising risk as a result of deploy-
ing this new generation of analytics products and technologies has already peeked the regulatory
interests. For instance, in [6], OSFI –the Canadian financial industry regulator– notes that: ”...At the
same time, AI presents challenges of transparency and explainability, auditability, bias, data quality,
representativeness and ongoing data governance. There are challenges in terms of overall model
risk management controls such as continuously evolving models and the use of AI in validation.
There may also be risks that are not fully understood and limited time would be available to respond
if those risks materialize.”
The above mentioned considerations are of course not new among the statistics and machine learning
communities. For instance, Brieman, in his famous “Two Cultures” paper [7] which was published
in the early days of “data science”, already points to the fundamental tensions between the data
modelling culture of statisticians in contrast with the algorithmic modelling culture in the machine
learning community. He argues therein that statistical methodology is primarily focused on choosing
of an understandable model and studying the resulting derived properties than assuring that the cho-
sen model is a good approximation of the underlying date generating process. The paper also argues
that the statistician’s approach to model validation is done as a yes-no matter using goodness-of-fit
tests and residual analysis and based on this approach, the models cannot be compared regarding
with how well they approximate the problem under study.
To make this point more concrete, one can also observe this limitation of statistical model diag-
nostics checking through the lens of Empirical Indistinguishably and Fragility [8]. An assump-
tion about a probability distribution is called fragile if the assumption holds for a distribution P
but the assumption fails for a distribution Q where Q is empirically indistinguishable from P . It
is said that Q is empirically indistinguishable from P if there is no reliable hypothesis test for:
H0 : X1, · · · , Xn ∼ P versus H1 : X1, · · · , Xn ∼ Q.
Taking the Total Variation distance (TV ) as the metric for proximity of two distributions,
TV (P,Q) = sup
A
|P(A)−Q(A)| (1)
it can be shown that for each distribution P , the neighbourhood,
Bn(P) = {Q, TV (P,Q) ≤ 
2
4n
} (2)
is distinguishable from P (see [8] and references therein). It is argued in [8] that properties such
as linearity, parameter sparsity, error constant variance are fragile (more pronounced in the high
dimensional problems) and hence, statistical diagnostic tests for checking them may not be reliable.
In the algorithmic modelling (ML practitioners) camp, the widely accepted principle is that accuracy
generally requires more complex prediction methods and simple and interpretable functions do not
make the most accurate predictors. While the lack of transparency as a result of increased com-
plexity of the machine learning models is often pointed out, the provided solutions for interpretation
of the model outputs (- as a means for establishing trust) seem to fail to give a coherent solution,
as pointed out in [9]:”...And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide
diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of
what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim inter-
pretability axiomatically, absent further explanation.” (also see [1] for a case study).
Our conceptual framework is primarily influenced by the point of view proposed in [10] which is
approaching the problem of ML interpretability in the context of the right to explanation in the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In Recital 71 of the GDPR [11], an indication of the
regulatory requirements for implementation of automated decisioning systems is given as follows:
...should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention,
to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such
assessment and to challenge the decision.
In [10], it is argued that given the significance of protections and rights for individuals in GDPR, the
purposes for explanations of an algorithm outcome must be determined from the perspective of the
data subject. Hence, they propose three objectives for explanations of automated decisions:
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• ”to inform and help the subject understand why a particular decision was reached,
• to provide grounds to contest adverse decisions, and
• to understand what could be changed to receive a desired result in the future, based on the
current decision-making model.”
Therefore, in [10], they counterfactual examples are proposed as a means to provide explanations
for algorithmic decisions satisfying the above requirements.They argue that while common ML
explanation algorithms attempt to convey the internal state or logic of an algorithm that leads to
a decision, counterfactuals describe the externalities that led to that decision. Counterfactuals are
specifically useful when considering the modern ML models with extremely complex architecture,
for which conveying this state to a non-specialist in a way that allows them to reason about the
behaviour of an algorithm is extremely difficult.
For the case of explaining the results of a credit scoring model to an individual, the counterfactual
example may take the form:”Your credit score is 700. If your income had been $85,000, with 5 years
of credit history, your score would have been 780.
Counterfactual examples are human-friendly explanations, because they are contrastive to the cur-
rent instance and they are selective, meaning they usually focus on a small number of feature
changes. There are usually multiple different counterfactual explanations. Each counterfactual
could tell a different “story” of how a certain outcome was reached. One counterfactual might say to
change feature A, the other counterfactual might say to leave A the same but change feature B, which
is a contradiction. However, it can be advantageous to have multiple counterfactual explanations,
because then humans can select the ones that correspond to their previous knowledge.
A counterfactual should be as similar as possible to the instance regarding feature values. This
requires a distance measure between two instances. The counterfactual should not only be close to
the original instance, but should also change as few features as possible. This can be achieved by
selecting an appropriate distance measure like the Manhattan distance. The last requirement is that a
counterfactual instance should have feature values that are likely. The counterfactual method creates
a new instance, but we can also summarize a counterfactual by reporting which feature values have
changed. This gives us two options for reporting our results, one can either report the counterfactual
instance or highlight which features have been changed between the instance of interest and the
counterfactual instance.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we employ a black box adversarial generation algorithm called PermuteAttack, in or-
der to generate adversarial example for a machine learning classifier trained on tabular data. Our
proposed method is based on genetic algorithm optimization and hence does not depend on differ-
entiability assumptions for the underlying model. We propose a post processing algorithm in order
to take into account higher order conditional interactions between the features in order to make sure
that the counterfactual example is realistic and is in-distribution. We also provide a graphical ex-
planation of the interactions between the features upon perturbations resulting in the instance level
counterfactual example.
2 Formal Framework for Adversarial Perturbations
In this section we outline the formal framework for adversarial perturbations.We follow the exposi-
tion in [12].
Consider an input space X ⊂ Rd and Y = {0, 1, ·,K − 1} the set of labels. Assume that there is a
distribution P over X from which the inputs are sampled, and the class label is determined by the
ground truth function f∗ : X −→ Y . For an input X drawn from X , its corresponding ground truth
class label is given by Y = f∗(X). Consider a deterministic classifier (for instance a functional
form learned as a result of a training procedure) classifiers f : X −→ Y . The performance of f can
be measured by the zero-one loss: L(f, x) = I(f(x) 6= f∗(x)), where I(x) is the indicator function
on X .
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For a classification task with the data distribution P and ground truth f∗, an adversarial perturbation
generator (APG) for a classifier f is a measurable mapping g : X −→ X satisfying the following
property:
• g preserves the class labels of the samples, that is, f∗(x) = f∗(g(x)) almost every where,
The above assumption, called the proximity assumption (see [13]), is important in all the implemen-
tations of adversarial perturbation. Concretely, in practice, it is reflected in the assumption that the
adversarial perturbations staying in the -neighbourhood of the original data point x (with respect to
some metric) and assuming that the resulting label of g(x) is the same as that of x .
The above characterization considers the case of a hard classifier, however, the implementation of
adversarial perturbations generalize to soft classifiers (where fˆ(x) ∈ (0, 1)) and hence to credit
scorecards. Recall that credit scorecards are essentially monotone decreasing transformations of the
output scores of the ML classifier considered as Probability of Default (PD) mapping the interval
(0, 1) onto a pre-specified range of credit scores (see [14]). More precisely, Typically in developing
a scorecard, one chooses a baseline score e.g. 600. The baseline score is assumed to denote a
good-bad odds of default (say 20:1), meaning
odds(x) =
1− fˆ(x)
fˆ(x)
=
1− PD
PD
= 20. (3)
It is common to assume that certain amount of increase in the score doubles the odds, meaning that
for instance, a score of 615 corresponds to the good bad odds of 40:1 and 630 corresponds 80:1 etc.
In this case, it is said that the Point to Double Odds (PDO) is 15. On can use a transformation such
as the one given below to map the soft classifier outputs (predicted PDs) to the range of scores:
score = 600 +
PDO
log(2)
∗ log(odds
20
). (4)
Creating adversarial examples for machine learning models is a very well studied area. However,
these algorithms are not very well-suited for tabular data, since the gradient-guided small pertur-
bations used in these algorithms could change the distribution of the tabular data. The distribution
changes are more pronounced in the presence of discrete and categorical variables. Here, we review
some of the well-known adversarial attacks.
Examples of gradient based algorithms: Prototype guided algorithms [15, 16] use an autoencoder,
which is trained to reconstruct instances of the training set, to make the perturbation meaningful. In
addition, a prototype loss is added, which tries to minimize the `2 distance between the counter-
factual and the nearest prototype. As a result, the perturbations are guided to the closest prototype,
speeding up the counterfactual search and making the perturbations more meaningful as they move
towards a typical in-distribution instance. However, similar to all other gradient based algorithms
they cannot handle the categorical variables easily. In addition autoencoders are not very effective
for the tabular data (more complicated algorithms must be used such as [17, 18]).
Examples of gradient free algorithms: The zeroth order optimization (ZOO) [19] attack builds
on the C&W attack to perform black-box attacks [20], by modifying the loss function such that
it only depends on the output of the DNN, and performing optimization with gradient estimates
obtained via finite differences. GenAttack [21] relies on genetic algorithms, which are population
based gradient-free optimization strategies. These algorithms are also based on adding noise as the
perturbation which causes unlikely feature values and cannot handle the categorical variables.
Our proposed counterfactual generation algorithm, called PermuteAttack, is inspired by the GenAt-
tack algorithm [21], with a major difference that PermuteAttack relies on permutation as the data
perturbation rather than adding small random values.
3 Proposed Algorithm
PermuteAttack is based on gradient-free optimization genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are
inspired by the natural selection and evolution. The optimization starts from a pool of samples called
population, P , which evolve iteratively to increase a fitness function (i.e., the optimization cost
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function). In each iteration the population (the population in each iteration is called a generation)
goes through selection, crossover, and mutation. In the selection step new population are randomly
selected based on their fitness (calculated using the fitness function), meaning the samples with
lower costs in a minimization objective have higher chance of being selected. The next generation is
generated through a combination of crossover and mutation. Crossover combines the features of the
two parents in a random order. Mutation applies some perturbations to some of the features which
are chosen randomly.
The main difference between our algorithm and other counterfactual algorithms is in the way that
the samples are perturbed. In the available genetic algorithm based adversarial attacks, the samples
are perturbed by a small noise within a `p-ball, which creates some unlikely values specially in
the case of categorical and ordinal features. PermuteAttack on the other hand perturbs the sample
by permuting randomly selected features. The permutation values are selected randomly from the
possible values of the feature in the training data. Therefore, the chosen values are always valid and
likely, and the probability distribution of the features remains the same in the new generations.
3.1 Perturbation Model
Let Π = {pi1, pi2, · · · , pin!} be a set of n-length vectors each containing a different permutation
of the set {1, 2, · · · , n} and X = [X1, X2, · · · , Xm] ⊂ Rd×m be the input data with length of d
(each row being a sample of the data) and m columns (columns represent the features). We denote
Xi [pil] , pil ∈ Π as a permutation of Xi meaning its value is randomly selected from the possible
values in the column i. f represents the model fitted on (X,Y ) pairs, where Y ∈ Y,Y ⊂ RK
is the target label with K possible classes and f(x) ⊂ RK is the model prediction for input x =
{x1, · · · , xm} ⊂ Rm. In addition, x(i)perm = {x1, · · · , Xi[pil, 0], · · · , xm} denotes a sample with
ith column being permuted by pil and the first value being chosen (i.e., first row of the permuted
column).
The goal of PermuteAttack is to find the xperm which has the least number of permuted columns
(features), δ0,max, and the amount of change to be minimum within an `2-ball of δ2,max. The
permuted sample that satisfies these conditions is the counterfactual xcnt.
arg max
c∈C
f(xcnt) = t such that
‖xorig − xcnt‖0 ≤ δ0,max and ‖xorig − xcnt‖2 ≤ δ2,max (5)
3.2 PermuteAttack
The proposed algorithm to solve equation (5) is presented in Algorithm 1, and the main functions of
the algorithm are described in this section.
3.2.1 Fitness Function
ComputeFitness evaluates the quality, of each population member. The fitness function should reflect
the threat model. PermuteAttack uses the following fitness function:
ComputeFitness(x) =‖f(x)t − f(xorig)t‖2−
ρ0‖xorig − x‖0−
ρ1‖xorig − x‖2 (6)
where f(x)t is the outcome for the target class t. x’s with higher fitness values are the samples
selected in the selection step.
3.2.2 Selection
Members with higher fitness are more likely to be a part of the next generation while members
with lower fitness are more likely to be replaced. The probability of selection for each population
member is computed by the Softmax of the fitness values to turn them into a probability distribution.
In addition, the member with highest fitness among the current generation is guaranteed to become
a member of the next generation, called an elite member.
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Algorithm 1: Proposed PermuteAttack Algorithm
Result: Write here the result
Input: original example xorig, target label t, mutation-range α, mutation probability ρ,
population size d, τ sampling temperature, training data Xtrain.
I Create initial generation Output: Counterfactual example xcnt
for i← 1 to d in population do
P0i ← Permute(xorig,Π,1)
end
for g ← 1 to G Generations do
for i← 1 to d in population do
Fg−1i = ComputeFitness(Pg−1i )
end
I Find the elite member.
xc = Pg−1argmaxj Fg−1j
if arg maxc f(xcnt) == t then
return xcnt . Found successful example
end
Pg1 = {xcnt}
I Compute Selection probabilities
probs← softmax(Fg−1τ )
for i← 2 to d in population do
Sample parent1 from Fg−1 according to probs
Sample parent2 from Fg−1 according to probs
child = CrossOver(parent1, parent2)
I Apply mutations
childmut = Mutate(child,Π,Fg−1i )
I Add mutated child to next generation
Pgi = {childmut}
end
I adaptively update α, ρ parameters
ρ, α = UpdateParameters(ρ, α)
end
3.2.3 Crossover
The features of the selected parents are randomly swapped.
3.2.4 Mutation
Some of the features of the generation members are selected according to their importance in chang-
ing the outcome and their value is randomly replaced by one of the possible values of the feature in
the training data. The selection probability is calculated by
Softmax({e1, e2, · · · , em}),
where ei is the changes in the f(x)t when ith feature is changed in previous generation. Therefore,
the features with lower effect on the outcome changes are less likely to be selected in the mutation.
3.2.5 UpdateParameters
If the conditions applied on `0 and `2 (represented by ρ = {ρ0, ρ1}) are tight and the algorithm is
unable to find any counterfactual example, the value of ρwill be decayed by a predefined factor. This
relaxes the conditions and enables the algorithm to find examples with more number of permuted
features, with higher deviations from the original values.
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3.2.6 One-hot encoding
One-hot encoding is one of the most common categorical variable encoding techniques. It adds
dummy variables to the data, each of which representing one of the possible values of the corre-
sponding categorical feature. For each sample, all the dummy variables are zero other than the one
that represents the value corresponding to the value of the feature in that specific sample.
Since the permutation of one-hot encoding is meaningless, before applying the permutations all the
one-hot encoded features are converted to ordinal. After mutation the new generated samples are
converted back to one-hot encoding to be able to compute the fitness.
3.2.7 Higher order statistics
The independent feature perturbation ignores the higher order statistical relations among the
features. This is a very common assumption in the adversarial perturbation algorithms, which
makes the generated adversarial samples unrealistic. Therefore, the adversarial examples can be
detected using an out-of-distribution detection algorithm [22].
To improve the quality of the adversarial examples, the sampling should be done from a realistic
joint data distribution. In the naive PermuteAttack the features are assumed to be independent and
each feature is perturbed independently. To address this issue we limit the permutation to more
similar values of the feature.
To achieve this goal all continuous features are discretized into smaller bins (e.g., 5 bins) such that
the same number of samples are in each feature bin. Using the discretized data, to permute the
ith feature, the potential permutation values are chosen from the samples that all their discretized
features other than i feature are the same, xj = x′j ,∀{j : j ∈ {1, ...,m} ∧ j 6= i}. Therefore,
sampling is from the conditional probability distribution p(xi|x−i) where x−i means all features
other than the ith one.
The conditional distribution improves the sampling for one feature given all other features. However,
in many mutation and crossover iterations more than one feature is permuted. To sample multiple
features we can follow the same procedure. For instance, if ith and jth features are jointly permuted,
the values are sampled from p(xi,j |x−i,j) by fixing all features other than i, j and choose xi,j value
from samples sharing similar discretized values in all features other than i, j.
However, we found this to be a very loose estimation. To increase the accuracy of the desired joint
feature sampling we use Gibbs sampling [23]. To estimate a sample of a joint distribution, Gibbs
sampling iteratively samples from the conditional distributions. It could be shown that this procedure
converges to the joint distribution. In practice, this convergence happens in few iterations. Here, we
use 5 iteration for each estimation.
This sampling strategy can directly be used in mutation. However, in crossover we swap the values
of randomly selected features in the parents. To make sure that this is close enough to the real
distribution of the data, we follow the same proposed sampling strategy but instead of randomly
choosing from the possible choices, we choose the value closest to the one we want to swap.
4 Experiments on German Credit Data
To test the proposed algorithm, German Credit dataset is used [24]. The goal of the model is to
predict the probability of defaulting of a loan given the account and customer information. The data
contains 20 features with 13 categorical ones, such as sex, purpose of the loan, housing type, if the
customer owns a phone, if the customer is a foreign worker. A scikit-learn RandomForest model
with 10 decision trees are used. The categorical features are one-hot encoded, creating 61 features
in total. There are 1000 samples in total, which are splitted into 60% train and 40% test samples.
After training the model, PermuteAttack is applied on the test data. We use ρ0 = 0.6 and ρ1 = 0.2.
Number of generation is 100, number of parents in mutations is 35, number of mating parents is 15,
and sampling temperature is 0.5. In addition, if the probability of the outcome does not change in an
iteration, ρ0 and ρ1 are relaxed by multiplication by 0.96. Using this hyper-parameters, the accuracy
of the model drops to 0 after attack, meaning 100% of the samples are successfully modified. The
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changes in the prediction of the model are depicted in Figure 1. All examples fall into top-left
and bottom-right regions, which shows 100% success in creation of counterfactual examples with
different prediction classes.
Figure 1: Shows how the outcomes are changed in the counterfactual examples. The x-axis shows
the prediction outcome of the model for original examples. The y-axis shows the predictions for
counterfactual examples.
On average 2.35 features are changed to switch the German credit model predictions. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of the number of changed features for 400 test samples of the German credit data.
Figure 3 shows the number of samples that each feature has been changed in.
Figure 2: Histogram of the number of features that are changed in test samples of the German Credit
data by PermuteAttack.
Table 1 and 2 show a defaulting and a not-defaulting customer and their counterfactual examples
generated with PermuteAttack. equation 4 is used to calculate the reported credit scores.
The example shown in table 1 corresponds to a not-defaulting customer. Three counterfactual exam-
ples are created as the most similar defaulting cases. In the first example (CF1) “purpose” is changed
from “domestic appliances” to “new car” and “property” is changed from “saving / life insurance” to
“unknown”. In CF2, property type is changed similar to CF1 and “housing” is changed from “own”
to “for free”. In CF3, housing is changed similar to CF2, job is changed from “un-skilled resident”
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to “skilled employee official”, and “present employee” changed from “1 to 4 years” to “less than 1
year”.
The example shown in table 2 corresponds to a defaulting customer, for which, three not-defaulting
counterfactual examples are reported. In CF1 “saving” is changed from “< 100 DM” to “>100DM”.
In CF2, “account check status” is changed from “<0 DM” to “>200 DM / salary assignments for
at least 1 year”. In CF3 “other debtors” is changed from “none” to “guarantor”.
Reporting multiple alternatives as the counterfactual examples helps us to use the most relevant
scenario for the customers when explaining the decision of the model and providing feedback to
improve their credit score [10]. For instance in the reported example, to improve the credit score
and to become eligible for the loan, the customer can increase the amount of saving, or use the
checking account in the bank for salary deposits, or the customer can have a guarantor.
Features Original CF1 CF2 CF3
duration in month 12 12 12 12
credit amount 2214 2214 2214 2214
installment as income perc 4 4 4 4
present res since 3 3 3 3
age 24 24 24 24
credits this bank 1 1 1 1
people under maintenance 1 1 1 1
account check status 1 1 1 1
credit history 3 3 3 3
purpose 4 2 4 4
savings 1 1 1 1
present emp since 2 2 2 1
personal status sex 3 3 3 3
other debtors 2 2 2 2
property 0 3 3 0
other installment plans 1 1 1 1
housing 1 1 0 0
job 3 3 3 1
telephone 0 0 0 0
foreign worker 1 1 1 1
Pred. Proba 0.13 0.59 0.6 0.6
Credit Score 641 592 591 591
Table 1: Counterfactual examples for a not defaulting customer.
To check if there is any relation between the adversarially perturbed features and the importance
of the features in the model, SHAP feature importance is used. Figure 4 illustrates the feature
importance of the trained model measured by SHAP values [25].
As can be seen from Figure 3 and Figure 4, the most important features and the most frequently
perturbed features are very well aligned. However, the exact order is changed in some features.
For instance, “other installment plans” is the 10th important feature and 4th frequently perturbed
feature. The same behaviour could be observed for “housing”. On the other hand some features
like “duration in month” are more important from SHAP perspective than adversarial perturbation.
To understand the potential reason for this behaviour we can look at the features that are perturbed
together.
Figure 5 shows how the features are adversarially perturbed together. The vertices of the graph show
the features that are changed together at least in one counterfactual example. The edges connect
the vertices that are changed in the same counterfactual example. The edge width (connection
weight) is proportional to the number of counterfactual examples that the edge is present in. For
instance “property” and “account check status” are changed together in 42 examples, while “job“
and “account check status” are change together in only 2 examples. Therefore, as can be seen in the
graph the weight of the edge connecting “property” to “account check status” is much higher than
the edge between “job” and “account check status”.
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Features Original CF1 CF2 CF3
duration in month 12 12 12 12
credit amount 1858 1858 1858 1858
installment as income perc 4 4 4 4
present res since 1 1 1 1
age 22 22 22 22
credits this bank 1 1 1 1
people under maintenance 1 1 1 1
account check status 1 1 2 1
credit history 3 3 3 3
purpose 7 7 7 7
savings 1 0 1 1
present emp since 1 1 1 1
personal status sex 0 0 0 0
other debtors 2 2 2 1
property 1 1 1 1
other installment plans 1 1 1 1
housing 2 2 2 2
job 1 1 1 1
telephone 0 0 0 0
foreign worker 1 1 1 1
Pred. Proba 0.63 0.46 0.42 0.47
Credit Score 588 603 607 602
Table 2: Counterfactual examples for a defaulting customer.
Figure 3: Number of samples that each feature has been changed in.
Looking at the degree of the features/vertices, it can be seen that “other installment plans” has a high
degree with some strong connections to “credit history”, “property”, and “account check status”, all
of which are among the most important features of the model. Therefore, it could be hypothesized
that there is a high interaction among these features in the model that is being utilized by Permu-
tateAttack to flip the classification outcome.
Looking at the perturbed feature frequency, it can be observed that some information such as “age”,
“personal status sex”, and “foreign worker” are not being utilized by the algorithm to change the
outcome of the model. Does this mean that for people with same banking history, changing the
gender and citizenship status does not have a significant effect on the outcome of the model? This
can motivate more investigations about the model fairness. To do so, we use PermuteAttack to
only perturb the sensitive attributes, namely: “age”, “personal status sex”, and “foreign worker”.
10
Figure 4: SHAP value feature importance [25].
Figure 5: Graph of the co-occurrence of the changed features in German credit dataset.
Using these three features 26.25% of the attacks are successful (105 out of 400 test samples). Fig-
ure 6 shows the aggregate feature perturbations when the predictions are changed from default to
not-defaulting and vice-versa. Based on this result, changing “personal status sex” could cause a
change in prediction from default to not-default; and changing “foreign worker” from yes to no
could change the prediction from not-default to default. However, there is an interaction among
these three features, causing non-monotonicity in the model, that makes the exact analysis more
complicated. For example in both cases the overall increase in age is more effective than its reduc-
tion, with a more pronounced effect on not-default to default changes. The overall hypothesis would
be that there are possible discrimination against some of the sensitive attributes.
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Figure 6: Aggregate of feature changes in 105 successful attacks by changing only the sensitive
features, “age”, “personal status sex”, and “foreign worker”.
In [26] it is suggested that an adversarial attack on tabular data is imperceptible if attackers minimize
the manipulations on the important features, which are easily detectable by an expert. Therefore, the
attack to be imperceptible should rely on less important features which are harder to detect.
Although, we use PermuteAttack as an algorithm for counterfactual example generation, since it
is based on the idea of adversarial attack, we decided to explore the effect of removing the most
important features from attack. The feature importance is measured by SHAP, Figuer 4; and the first
three most important features, “account check status”, “purpose”, and “credit history” are excluded
from PermuteAttack. As depicted in Figure 7 after excluding the most important features, on average
the number of features that should be changed to successfully change the prediction increases to 3.7.
A summary of the perturbed features is shown in Figure 8. Figure 9 shows the co-occurrence of the
features.
Figure 7: Histogram of the number of features that are changed in test samples of the German Credit
data by PermuteAttack when most important features (based on SHAP values) are removed.
To check the effect of Gibbs sampling in making more realistic counterfactual examples, we train
a model to discriminate between the real and adversarially generated samples. To do so we run
PermuteAttack on the test data and generate one set of counterfactual examples. The real data is
labeled one and the counterfactual examples are labeled zero. Using this data a model is trained.
Then we change the random seed and generate another set of new counterfactual examples to test
the trained model. The more similar the generated examples are to the real data, the accuracy of the
test will be lower.
12
Figure 8: Number of samples that each feature has been changed in, after removing the most impor-
tant features, based on SHAP values.
Figure 9: Graph of the co-occurrence of the changed features in German credit dataset, after remov-
ing the most important features, based on SHAP values.
We trained two models: one using the naive method (without Gibbs sampling) and one with Gibbs
sampling. Each model is tested on the counter examples generated using the same technique used
to generate the training data.
The model trained on counter-examples without Gibbs sampling fails in 12% of the test counter-
examples. This means that only 12% of the generated counter-examples are similar enough to
the real data to not be detected by discriminator model as adversarial examples. However, when
the model is trained with the examples generated with Gibbs sampling it fails in 49% of the test
samples. Meaning that 49% of the generated counterexamples are similar enough to real data to not
be detected with the discriminator model as adversarially generated samples.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper PermuteAttack was proposed as a model criticism and explanation algorithm based on
adversarially generated counterfactual examples for validation and explanation of Machine Learn-
ing (ML) models employed for retail credit scoring in finance trained on tabular data. Using the
counterfactual examples increases the model behaviour understanding and can offer helpful feed-
back to the customers to improve the credit scores. PermuteAttack generates sensible and realistic
counterfactual examples using permutation as the adversarial perturbation which keeps the range
and the distribution of each individual feature the same as the original training data. In addition, us-
ing Gibbs sampling the joint distribution of the synthetically generated examples follow the original
data distribution.
6 Future Directions
In this paper data discretization and Gibbs sampling are used to estimate conditional probability
of the features. A possible future direction would be replacing this process with more accurate
techniques such as conditional Gaussian Copula models [27] and conditional generative machine
learning models [28].
Figure 10: The authors are fans of the cartoon on the cover page of [29], describing one of the excit-
ing interactions between theoretical physics and mathematics in the past fifty years.(Top row- in the
60’s), left: physicists studying Feynman diagrams- considered as ill-defined objects by mathemati-
cians, right: mathematicians inventing Index Theory. (bottom row- in the 90’s), folks pondering the
same notions from the lens of the other camp. The cartoon fits to the narrative of Brieman’s “Two
Cultures” [7] on fruits of the clashes between statistics and machine learning camps as scientific
disciplines.
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